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Abstract

owners need to export/publish the privacy-sensitive data.
A data perturbation procedure can be simply described as
follows. Before the data owner publishes the data, they
randomly change the data in certain way to disguise the
sensitive information while preserving the particular data
property that is critical for building meaningful data mining models. Several perturbation techniques have been
proposed recently, among which the most popular ones are
randomization approach [3] and condensation approach
[1]. In this paper, we will propose a new data perturbation
technique specifically for a class of popular data classification mining models.
Loss of Privacy vs. Loss of Information.
Perturbation techniques are often evaluated with two basic
metrics, loss of privacy and loss of model-specific information (resulting in loss of accuracy for data classification). An ideal data perturbation algorithm aims at minimizing both privacy loss and information loss. However,
the two metrics are not well-balanced in many existing
perturbation techniques [3, 2, 7, 1].
Loss of privacy can be intuitively described as the difficulty level in estimating the original values from the perturbed data. The more difficult the original values are estimated, the less loss of privacy is. In [3], the variance of
the added random noise is used as the level of difficulty
for estimating the original values. However, later research
[7, 2] reveals that variance is not an effective indicator for
random noise addition since the original data distribution
is known − if a particular data distribution is considered,
certain part of data in the distribution cannot be effectively
protected. In addition, [14] shows that the loss of privacy
is also subject to the special attacks that can reconstruct
the original data from the perturbed data.
Loss of information typically refers to the amount of
critical information preserved about the data sets after the
perturbation. However, different data mining tasks, such
as classification mining and association rule mining, typically utilize different set of information about the data
sets. Existing techniques do not explicitly address that
the critical information is actually task-specific. We argue that the information to be preserved after data perturbation should be highly specific to the mining tasks
and even to a particular model. For example, the task

This paper presents a random rotation perturbation approach for privacy preserving data classification. Concretely, we identify the importance of classificationspecific information with respect to the loss of information
factor, and present a random rotation perturbation framework for privacy preserving data classification. Our approach has two unique characteristics. First, we identify
that many classification models utilize the geometric properties of datasets, which can be preserved by geometric
rotation. We prove that the three types of classifiers will
deliver the same performance over the rotation perturbed
dataset as over the original dataset. Second, we propose
a multi-column privacy model to address the problems of
evaluating privacy quality for multidimensional perturbation. With this metric, we develop a local optimal algorithm to find the good rotation perturbation in terms of
privacy guarantee. We also analyze both naive estimation and ICA-based reconstruction attacks with the privacy model. Our initial experiments show that the random rotation approach can provide high privacy guarantee while maintaining zero-loss of accuracy for the discussed classifiers.

1 Introduction
We are entering a highly connected informationintensive era. This information age has enabled organizations to collect large amount of data continuously.
Many organizations wish to discover and study interesting
patterns and trends over the large collections of datasets
to improve their productivity and competitiveness. Privacy preserving data mining has become an important enabling technology for integrating data and mining interesting patterns from private collections of databases. This
has resulted in a considerable amount of work on privacy
preserving data mining methods in recent years such as
[1, 3, 5, 2, 8, 9, 15, 18, 19], etc.
Data perturbation techniques are one of the most popular models for privacy preserving data mining [3, 1]. It
is especially convenient for applications where the data
1

of building decision trees primarily concerns the column
distribution. Hence, the quality of preserving column distribution becomes the key in applying randomization approach [3] to decision tree model. In comparison, the
K-Nearest-Neighbor (KNN) model concerns primarily the
distance relationship, nothing to do with the column distribution. We observed that, most classification models like
KNN typically concern the multi-dimensional information rather than single column distribution. Thus, the perturbation is required to preserve multi-dimensional taskspecific information rather than single dimensional information. To our knowledge, very few perturbation-based
privacy protection proposals so far have considered multidimensional perturbation techniques.
Interesting to note is that the loss of privacy metric and
the loss of information metric have exhibited contradictory rather than complimentary results in existing data perturbation techniques [3, 2, 7, 1]. Typically data perturbation algorithms that aims at minimizing the loss of privacy
often have to bear with higher information loss. The intrinsic correlation between the loss of privacy and the loss
of information raises a number of important issues regarding how to find a right balance between the two measures
and how to build a data perturbation algorithm that ensures desired privacy requirements and yet minimizes the
loss of information for the specific data mining task.
Contribution and Scope of the paper.
Bearing these issues in mind, we have developed a random
rotation perturbation approach to privacy preserving data
classification. In contrast to other existing privacy preserving classification methods [1, 3, 9, 15], our random rotation based perturbation exploits the task-specific multidimensional information about the datasets to be classified, which is critical to a large category of classification
algorithms, and aims at producing a robust data perturbation that exhibits a better balance between loss of privacy
and loss of information.
Concretely, we observe that the multi-dimensional
geometric properties of datasets are the critical “taskspecific information” for many classification algorithms.
By preserving multi-dimensional geometric properties of
the original dataset, classifiers trained over the perturbed
dataset presents the same quality as classifiers over the
original dataset. One intuitive way to preserve the multidimensional geometric properties is to perturb the original dataset through geometric rotation transformation. We
have identified and proved that kernel methods, SVM classifiers with the three popular kernels, and the hyperplanebased classifiers, are the three categories of classifiers that
are “rotation-invariant”.
Another important challenge for the random rotation
perturbation approach is the privacy loss measurement
(the level of uncertainty) and privacy assurance (the resilience of the rotation transformation against unauthorized disclosure). Given that a random rotation based
perturbation is a multi-dimensional perturbation, the privacy guarantee of the multiple dimensions (attributes)

should be evaluated collectively to ensure the privacy of
all columns involved and the privacy of the multi-column
correlations. We design a unified privacy model to tackle
the problem of privacy evaluation for multi-dimensional
perturbation, which addresses three types of possible attacks: direct estimation, approximate reconstruction, and
distribution-based inference attacks.
With the unified privacy metric, we present the privacy
assurance of the random rotation perturbation as an optimization problem: given that all rotation transformations
result in zero-loss of accuracy for the discussed classifiers,
we want to pick one rotation matrix that provides higher
privacy guarantee and stronger resilience against the inference attacks. Our experiments demonstrate that with
our attack resilient random rotation selection algorithm,
our random rotation perturbation can achieve much higher
privacy guarantee and more robust in countering inference
attacks than other existing perturbation techniques.
In a nutshell, random rotation perturbation refines the
definition of loss of privacy and loss of information for
multidimensional perturbation, and provides a particular
method for “conveniently raising the privacy guarantee
without loss of accuracy for the data classification task”.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2
briefly reviews the related work. In Section 3, we describe the properties of geometric rotation transformation
and prove that the three most popular categories of classifiers are invariant to rotation. Properties of general linear
transformation are also briefly discussed. Section 4 introduces a general-purpose privacy measurement model for
multi-column data perturbation and characterizes the privacy property of the rotation-based perturbation in terms
of this metric. Three types of inference attacks are analyzed under this privacy model. We present the experimental results in Section 5 and conclude our work in section 6.

2 Related Work
A considerable amount of work on privacy preserving data mining methods have been reported in recent
years [1, 3, 5, 2, 8, 19], etc. The most relevant work
about perturbation techniques includes the random noise
addition methods and the condensation-based perturbation technique. We below focus our discussion on these
two sets of techniques and discuss their weakness in the
context of privacy preserving data classification.
Random Noise Addition Approach
The random noise addition approach can be briefly
described as follows. Suppose that the original values
(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) from a column are randomly drawn from
a random variable X, which has some kind of distribution. The randomization process changes the original data
with Y = X + R, where R is a zero mean random noise.
The resulting tuples (x1 + r1 , x2 + r2 , . . . , xn + rn ) and
the distribution of R are published. A reconstruction al2

cality, it is possible to regenerate a set of k records to approximately preserve the distribution and covariance. The
record regeneration algorithm tries to preserve the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of each group. As a result, the
distribution and the covariance of the points in the group
are approximately preserved as shown in Figure 1. The
authors demonstrated that the condensation approach can
preserve data covariance well, and thus will not significantly sacrifice the accuracy of classifiers if the classifiers
are trained with the perturbed data.

gorithm is developed in [3] to construct the distribution
of X based on the perturbed data and the distribution of
R. In particular, an expectation-maximization (EM) reconstruction algorithm was proposed in [2]. The distribution reconstructed by EM algorithm is proved to converge
to the maximum likelihood estimate of the original distribution. A new decision-tree algorithm for the randomization approach is developed in [3], in order to build the
decision tree from the perturbed data. Randomization approach is also used in privacy-preserving association-rule
mining [8].
While the randomization approach is intuitive, several
researchers have recently identified privacy breaches as
one of the major problems with the randomization approach. Kargupta et al. [14, 11] observed that the spectral properties of the randomized data can be utilized to
separate noise from the private data. The filtering algorithms based on random matrix theory are used to approximately reconstruct the private data from the perturbed
data. The authors demonstrated that the randomization
approach preserves little privacy in many cases.
Furthermore, there has been research [1] addressing
other weaknesses associated with the value based randomization approach. For example, most of existing
randomization and distribution reconstruction algorithms
only concern about preserving the distribution of single columns. There has been surprisingly little attention
paid on preserving value distributions over multiple correlated dimensions. Second, value-based randomization
approach needs to develop new distribution-based classification algorithms. In contrast, our random rotation
perturbation approach does not require modify existing
data classification algorithms when applied to perturbed
datasets. This is a clear advantage over techniques such as
the method discussed in [3].
The randomization approach is also generalized by [7]
and [4]. [7] proposes a refined privacy metric for the general randomization approach, and [4] develops a framework based on the refined privacy metric to improve the
balance between the privacy and accuracy.
Condensation-based perturbation approach The condensation approach [1] aims at preserving the covariance
matrix for multiple columns. Different from the randomization approach, it perturbs multiple columns as a whole
to generate entire “perturbed dataset”. The authors argue
that the perturbed dataset preserves the covariance matrix,
and thus, most existing data mining algorithms can be applied directly to the perturbed dataset without redeveloping any new algorithms.
The condensation approach can be briefly described as
follows. It starts by partitioning the original data into krecord groups. Each group is formed by two steps – randomly select a record from the existing records as the center of group, and then find the (k − 1) nearest neighbors
of the center as the other (k − 1) members. The selected
k records are removed from the original dataset before
forming the next group. Since each group has small lo-
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Figure 1. Condensation approach
However, we have observed that the condensation approach is weak in protecting the private data. The KN N based data groups result in some serious conflicts between
preserving covariance information and preserving privacy.
As the authors claim, the smaller the size of the locality in
each group, the better the quality of preserving the covariance with the regenerated k records is. Note that the
regenerated k records are confined in the small spatial locality as Figure 1 shows. We design an algorithm that tries
to find the nearest neighbor in the original data for each
regenerated record. The result (section 5) shows that the
difference between the regenerated records and the nearest neighbor in original data are very small, and thus, the
original data records can be estimated from the perturbed
data with high confidence.

3 Rotation Transformation and Data Classification
In this section, we first identify the set of geometric
properties of the datasets, which are significant to most
classification algorithms. Then we describe the definition
of a rotation-based perturbation, and will discuss the effect
of geometric transformations to three categories of popular classification algorithms. In particular, we will discuss
the rotation transformation. Before entering concrete discussion, we define the notations for datasets.
Training Dataset and Unclassified Dataset. Training
dataset is the part of data that has to be exported/published
in privacy-preserving data classification. A classifier
learns the classification model from the training data and
3

then is applied to classify the unclassified data. Suppose
that X is a training dataset consisting of N data rows
(records) and d columns (attributes). For the convenience
of mathematical manipulation, we use Xd×N to notate the
dataset, i.e., X = [x1 . . . xN ], where xi is a data tuple,
representing a vector in the real space Rd . Each data tuple belongs to a predefined class, which is determined by
its class label attribute yi . The class labels can be nominal (or continuous for regression). The class label attribute of the data tuple is public, i.e., privacy-insensitive.
All other attributes containing private information needs
to be protected. Unclassified dataset could also be expored/published with privacy-protection if necessary.

We can treat the classification problem as function approximation problem – the classifiers are the functions
learned from the training data [10]. Therefore, we can
use functions to represent the classifiers. Let fˆX represent a classifier fˆ trained with dataset X and fˆX (Y ) be
the classification result on dataset Y . Let T (X) be any
transformation function, which transforms the dataset X
to another dataset X 0 . We use Err(fˆX (Y )) to notate the
error rate of classifier fˆX on testing data Y and let ε be
some small real number, |ε| < 1.
Definition 1. A classifier fˆ is invariant to some
transformation T if and only if Err(fˆX (Y )) =
Err(fˆT (X) (T (Y ))) + ε for any training dataset X and
testing dataset Y .

3.1 Properties of Geometric Rotation

With the strict condition fˆX (Y ) ≡ fˆT (X) (T (Y )), we
also have the following corollary.

Let Rd×d represent the rotation matrix. Geometric rotation of the data X is generally notated as a function
g(X), g(X) = RX. Note that the transformation will not
change the class label of data tuples, i.e., Rxi , the rotation
of data record xi , still has the label yi .
A rotation matrix Rd×d is defined as a matrix having the follows properties. Let RT represent the transpose of the matrix R, rij represent the (i, j) element of
R, and I be the identity matrix. Both the rows and the
columns of R are orthonormal [16], i.e., for any column
Pd
r2 = 1, and for any two columns j and k,
j,
Pd i=1 ij
i=1 rij rik = 0. The similar property is held for rows.
The definition infers that RT R = RRT = I. It also implies that by changing the order of the rows or columns of
rotation matrix, the resulting matrix is still a rotation matrix. A random rotation matrix can be efficiently generated
following the Haar distribution [17].
A key feature of rotation transformation is preserving
length. Let xT represent the transpose of vector x, and
k x k= xT x represent the length of a vector x. By the
definition of rotation matrix, we have k Rx k=k x k
Thus, rotation also preserves the Euclidean distance between any pair of points x and y, due to k R(x − y) k=k
x − y k.
Similarly, the inner product is also invariant to rotation.
Let < x, y > = xT y represent the inner product of x and
y. We have < Rx, Ry > = xT RT Ry =< x, y >.
Intuitively, rotation also preserves the geometric shapes
such as hyperplane and hyper curved surface in the multidimensional space.

Corollary 1. In particular, if fˆX (Y ) ≡ fˆT (X) (T (Y )), for
any training dataset X and testing dataset Y , the classifier is invariant to the transformation T (X).
If a classifier fˆ is invariant to rotation transformation,
we specifically name it as a rotation-invariant classifier.
In the subsequent sections, we will prove that kernel methods, SVM classifiers with certain kernels, and
hyperplane-based classifiers, are the three categories of
classifiers that are rotation-invariant. The proofs are based
on the strict condition given by Corollary 1.
KNN Classifiers and Kernel Methods
A KNN classifier determines the class label of a point by
looking at the labels of its k nearest neighbors in the training dataset and classifies the point to the class that most of
its neighbors belong to. Since the distances between any
points are not changed after rotation, the k nearest neighbors are not changed and thus the classification result is
not changed after rotation. Therefore, we have the first
conclusion about the k Nearest Neighbor (KNN) classifiers.
Lemma 1. KNN classifiers are rotation-invariant.
KNN classifier is a special case of kernel methods. We
assert that any kernel methods will be invariant to rotation too. Same as the KNN classifier, a traditional kernel method is a local classification method, which classifies the new data only based on the information from the
neighbors in the training data.

3.2 Rotation-invariant Classifiers

Theorem 1. Any kernel methods are invariant to rotation.

We first define the concept of “transformation-invariant
classifiers”, and then discuss the concrete classifiers having certain property. We say a classification algorithm
is invariant to a transformation, if the classifier trained
using the transformed data has the similar accuracy as
that trained by the original data. We formally define a
transformation-invariant classifier as follows.

Proof. Let us formally define the kernel methods first. In
general, a kernel method also estimates the class label
of a point x with the class labels of its neighbors. Let
Kλ (x, xi ) represent the weighting function of any point
xi in x’s neighborhood, which is named as kernel. Let
{x1 , x2 , . . . , xn } be the points in the neighborhood of x.
4

, where γ is a parameter chosen by the user, a larger γ
corresponding to assigning a higher penalty to errors. We
see that the training result of αi is determined by the form
of kernel function K(xi , xj ). Given αi , β0 can be determined by solving yi fˆX (xi ) = 1 for any xi [10], which is
again determined by the kernel function. Therefore, it is
clear that if K(Rx, Rxi ) = K(x, xi ) is held, the training
procedure results in the same set of parameters.
There are the three popular choices for kernels listed in
the SVM literature [6, 10].

A kernel classifier for continuous class labels1 is defined
as,
Pn
Kλ (x, xi )yi
ˆ
fX (x) = Pi=1
(1)
n
i=1 Kλ (x, xi )
Let λ be the width that determines the geometric area of
the neighborhood at x [10]. The kernel Kλ (x, xi ) is defined as,
k x − xi k
Kλ (x, xi ) = D(
)
(2)
λ
D(t) is a function, for example, D(t)
=
√1 exp{−t2 /2}. Since k Rx − Rxi k=k x − xi k
2π
and λ is constant, D(t) is not changed after rotation
and, thus, Kλ (Rx, Rxi ) = Kλ (x, xi ). Since the geometric area around the point is not changed, the point
set in the neighborhood of Rx are still the rotation of
those in the neighborhood of x, i.e. {x1 , x2 , . . . , xn }
⇒ {Rx1 , Rx2 , . . . , Rxn } and these n points are used in
fˆRX , which makes fˆRX (Rx) = fˆX (x).

d-th degree polynomial:
K(x, x0 ) = (1+ < x, x0 >)d ,
radial basis: K(x, x0 ) = exp(− k x − x0 k /c),
neural network: K(x, x0 ) = tanh(κ1 < x, x0 > +κ2 )
Note that the three kernels only involve distance and inner
product calculation. As we discussed in section 3.1, the
two operations keep invariant to the rotation transformation. Apparently, K(Rx, Rx0 ) = K(x, x0 ) are held for
the three kernels. Therefore, training with the rotated data
will not change the parameters for the SVM classifiers using the three popular kernels.
Similarly, fˆX (x) = fˆRX (Rx) is held for the classification function (3) for the same reason.

Support Vector Machines
Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifiers also utilize
kernel functions in training and classification. However,
it uses the information from all points in the training set.
Let yi be the class label to a tuple xi in the training set, αi
and β0 be the parameters determined by training. A SVM
classifier calculates the classification result of x using the
following function.
fˆX (x) =

N
X

αi yi K(x, xi ) + β0

Perceptrons
Perceptron is the simplest neural network, which is a linear method for classification. We use perceptron as the
representative example for hyperplane-based linear classifiers. The result for perceptron classifier can be easily
generalized to all hyperplane-based linear classifiers.
A perceptron classifier uses a hyperplane to separate
the training data, with the weights wT = [w1 , . . . , wd ]
and bias β0 . The weights and bias parameters are determined by the training process. A trained classifier is represented as follows.
fˆX (x) = wT x + β0

(3)

i=1

Different from the kernel methods, which do not have
a training procedure, we shall prove that SVM classifiers
are invariant to rotation in two steps, 1) training with the
rotated data results in the same set of parameters αi and
β0 ; and 2) the classification function fˆ is invariant to rotation.

Theorem 3. Perceptron classifiers are invariant to rotation.

Theorem 2. SVM classifiers using polynomial, radial basis, and neural network kernels are invariant to rotation.

Proof. As Figure 2 shows, the hyperplane can be represented as wT (x − xt ) = 0, where w is the perpendicular
axis to the hyperplane, and xt represents the deviation of
the plane from the origin (i.e., β0 = −wT xt ). Intuitively,
rotation will make the classification hyperplane rotated as
well, which rotates the perpendicular axis w to Rw and
the deviation xt to Rxt . Let xr represent the data in the
rotated space. The rotated hyperplane is represented as
(Rw)T (xr − Rxt ) = 0, and the classifier is transformed
to fˆRX (xr ) = wT RT (xr − Rxt ). Since xr = Rx and
RT R = I, fˆRX (xr ) = wT RT R(x − xt ) = wT (x − xt )
= fˆX (x). The two classifiers are equivalent.
In general, since rotation will preserve distance, density, and geometric shapes, any classifiers that find the decision boundary based on the geometric properties of the
dataset, will still find the rotated decision boundary.

Proof. The training problem is an optimization problem,
which maximizes the Lagrangian (Wolfe) dual objective
function [10]
LD =

N
X

αi − 1/2

i=1

N
X

αi αj yi yj K(xi , xj )

i,j=1

subject to:
0 < αi < γ,

N
X

αi yi = 0

i=1
1 It has different form for discrete class labels, but the proof will be
similar.
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based on column privacy metric. An abstract privacy
model is defined as follows. Let p be the column privacy
metric vector p = (p1 , p2 , . . . , pd ), and there are privacy
weights associated to the columns, respectively, notated
as w = (w1 , w2 , . . . , wd ). Φ = Φ(p, w) defines the privacy guarantee. Basically, the design of privacy model
should consider determining the three factors p, w, and
function Φ.
We will leave the concrete discussion about the design
of p in the next section, and define the other two factors
first. Since different columns may have different importance in terms of the level of privacy-sensitivity, the first
design idea is to take the column importance into consideration. Let w denote the importance of columns in terms
of preserving privacy. Intuitively, the more important the
column is, the higher level of privacy guarantee will be
required for the perturbed data, corresponding to that colPd
umn. Therefore, we let i=1 wi = 1 and use pi /wi to
represent the weighted column privacy.
The second intuition is the concept of minimum privacy guarantee among all columns. Concretely, when
we measure the privacy quality of a multi-column perturbation, we need to pay special attention to the column having the lowest weighted column privacy, because
such columns could become the breaking point of privacy. Hence, we design the first composition function
Φ1 = mindi=1 {pi /wi } and call it minimum privacy guarantee. Similarly, the average privacy guarantee of the
Pd
multi-column perturbation Φ2 = d1 i=1 pi /wi is another
interesting measure.
With the definition of privacy guarantee, we can evaluate the privacy quality of a give perturbation, and most
importantly, we can use it to find the multi-dimensional
perturbation that optimizes the privacy guarantee. With
the rotation approach, we will demonstrate that it is convenient to adjust the perturbation method to considerably
increase the privacy guarantee without compromising the
accuracy of the classifiers.
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Figure 2. Hyperplane and its parameters

4 Evaluating Privacy Quality for Random
Rotation Perturbation
The goals of rotation based data perturbation are
twofold: preserving the accuracy of classifiers, and preserving the privacy of data. As we mentioned in the introduction, the loss of privacy and the loss of information
(accuracy) are often considered as a pair of conflict factors for other existing data perturbation approaches. In
contrast, a distinct feature of our rotation based perturbation approach is its clean separation of these two factors. The discussion about the rotation-invariant classifiers
has proven that the rotation transformation theoretically
guarantees zero-loss of accuracy for three popular types
of classifiers, which makes the random rotation perturbation applicable to a large category of classification applications. We dedicate this section to discuss how good the
rotation perturbation approach is in terms of preserving
privacy.
The critical step to identify the good rotation perturbation is to define a multi-column privacy measure for evaluating the privacy quality of any rotation perturbation to
a given dataset. With this privacy measure, we can employ some optimization methods to find the good rotation
perturbations for a given dataset.

4.2

4.1 Privacy Model for Multi-column Perturbation

Multi-column Privacy Analysis: A Unified
Privacy Metric

Intuitively, for data perturbation approach, the quality
of preserved privacy can be understood as the difficulty
level of estimating the original data from the perturbed
data. Basically, the attacks to the data perturbation techniques can be summarized in three categories: (1)estimating the original data directly from the perturbed data
[3, 2], without any other knowledge about the data (naive
inference); (2) approximately reconstructing the data from
the perturbed data and then estimating the original data
from the reconstructed data [14, 11] (approximation-based
inference); and (3) if the distributions of the original
columns are known, the values or the properties of the
values in the particular part of the distribution can be estimated [2, 7] (distribution-based inference). A unified metric should be applicable to all three types of inference at-

Unlike the existing value randomization methods,
where multiple columns are perturbed separately, the random rotation perturbation needs to perturb all columns together. The privacy quality of all columns is correlated
under one single transformation. Our approach to evaluating the privacy quality of random rotation perturbation
consists of two steps: First, we define a general-purpose
privacy metric that is effective for any multi-dimensional
perturbation method. Then, the metric is applied to analyze the random rotation perturbation.
Since in practice different columns(attributes) may
have different privacy concern, we consider that the
general-purpose privacy metric Φ for entire dataset is
6

tacks to determine the robustness of the perturbation technique. Due to the space limitation, we will not deal with
the issues about distribution-oriented attacks to random
rotation in this paper, and temporarily assume the column
distributions are unknown to the users.
Let the difference between the original column data
and the perturbed/reconstructed data be a random variable
D. Without any knowledge about the original data, the
mean and variance of the difference present the level of
difficulty for the estimation. Since the mean only presents
the average difference, which is not a robust measure for
protecting privacy, we choose to use the variance of the
difference (VoD) as the primary metric to determine the
level of difficulty in estimating the original data.
Let Y be a random variable, representing a column of
the dataset, Y0 be the perturbed/reconstructed result of
Y, and D be the difference between Y and Y0 . Thus
we have D = Y0 − Y. Let E[D] and V ar(D) denote
the mean and the variance of D respectively, y 0 be a perturbed/reconstructed value in Y0 , σ be the standard deviation of D, and c denote some constant depending on
the distribution of D and the confidence level. The corresponding original value y in Y is located in the range
defined below:

3. The unified column privacy metrics compose the privacy vector p. The composition functions Φ1 and Φ2
are applied to calculate the minimum privacy guarantee and the average privacy guarantee, respectively.
This above evaluation should be applied to all of the
three kinds of attacks and the lowest one should be considered as the final privacy guarantee.

4.3

Multi-column Privacy Analysis for Random
Rotation Perturbation

With the variance metric over the normalized data, we
can formally analyze the privacy quality of random rotation perturbation. Let X be the normalized dataset, X 0
be the rotation of X, and Id be the d-dimensional identity
matrix. Thus, VoD can be evaluated based on the difference matrix X 0 − X, and the VoD for i-th column is the
element (i,i) in the covariance matrix of X 0 − X, which is
represented as
Cov(X 0 − X)(i,i) = Cov(RX − X)(i,i)
=

((R − Id )Cov(X)(R − Id )T )(i,i)

(4)

Let rij represent the element (i, j) in the matrix R, and cij
be the element (i, j) in the covariance matrix of X. The
VoD for ith column is computed as follows.

[y 0 − E[D] − cσ, y 0 − E[D] + cσ]
The width of the estimation range, 2cσ, presents the hardness to guess the original value (or amount of preserved
privacy). In [3], Y0 is defined as Y0 = Y + R, R represents a zero mean noise random variable. Therefore,
E[D] = 0 and the estimation solely depends on the distribution of the added random noise R. For simplicity, we
use σ to represent the privacy level.
To evaluate the privacy quality of multi-dimensional
perturbation, we need to evaluate the privacy of all
perturbed columns together. Unfortunately, the singlecolumn privacy metric does not work across different
columns since it ignores the effect of value range and the
mean of the original data column. The same amount of
VoD is not equally effective for different value ranges.
One effective way to unify the different value ranges is
via normalization. With normalization, the unified privacy metric is calculated in following three steps:

Cov(X 0 − X)(i,i) =

d X
d
X
j=1 k=1

rij rik ckj − 2

d
X

rij cij + cii

j=1

(5)
When the random rotation matrix generated following
the Haar distribution, a considerable number of matrix
entries are approximately independent normal N(0, 1/d)
[13]. The full discussion about the numerical characteristics of the random rotation matrix is out of the scope of
this paper. However, we can still get some observations
from equation (5):
1. the mean level of V oDi is affected by the variance of
the original data column, i.e., cii . Large cii tends to
give higher privacy level on average.

1. Let si = 1/(max(Yi ) − min(Yi )), ti =
min(Yi )/(max(Yi ) − min(Yi )) denote the constants that are determined by the value range of the
column Yi . The column Yi is scaled to range [0,
1], generating Ysi , with the transformation Ysi =
si (Yi − ti ). This allows all columns to be evaluated
on the same base, eliminating the effect of diverse
value ranges.

2. The variance of V oDi affects the efficiency of
randomization. The larger the V ar(V oDi ), the
more likely the randomly generated rotation matrices can provide a high privacy level compared to the
mean level of V oDi . Exact form of V ar(V oDi )
should be complicated, but from the equation (5),
we can see V ar(V oDi ) might be tightly related to
the average of the squared covariance entries, i.e.
Pd Pd
O(1/d2 i=1 j=1 cij ).

0
. Let D0i
2. The normalized data Ysi is perturbed to Ysi
0
0
=Ysi − Ysi . We use V ar(Di ), instead of V ar(Di ),
as the unified measure of privacy quality.

3. V oDi only considers the i-th row vectors of rotation
matrix. Thus, it is possible to simply swap the rows
of R to locally improve the overall privacy guarantee.
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of the original signals X, from the mixed signals X 0 , if
the following conditions are satisfied:

The third observation leads us to propose a rowswapping based fast local optimization method for finding a better rotation from a given rotation. This method
can significantly reduce the search space and thus provides better efficiency. Our experimental result shows
that, with the local optimization, the minimum privacy
level can be increased by about 10% or more. We formalize the swapping-maximization method as follows: Consider a d-dimensional dataset. Let {(1), (2), . . . , (d)} be
a permutation of the sequence {1, 2, . . . , d}. Let the importance level of privacy preserving for the columns be
[w1 , w2 , . . . , wd ]. The goal is to find the permutation of
rows that maximize the minimum or average privacy guarantee for a given rotation matrix.

1. The source signals are independent, i.e., the row vectors of X are independent;
2. All the source signals must be non-Gaussian with
possible exception of one signal;
3. The number of observed signals, i.e. the number of
row vectors of X 0 , must be at least as large as the
independent source signals.
4. The transformation matrix A must be of full column
rank.

argmax{(1),(2),...,(d)} {
min1≤i≤d {(

d X
d
X

For rotation matrices, the 3rd and 4th conditions are
always satisfied. However, the first two conditions, especially the independency condition, although practical for
signal processing, seem not very common in data classification. In practice, the dependent source signals can be
approximately regarded as one signal in ICA and people
can often tolerate considerable errors in the applications of
audio/video signal reconstruction, cracking the privacy of
the original dataset X requires to exactly locate and precisely estimate the original row vectors. This has greatly
restricted the effectiveness of ICA model based attacks to
the rotation-based perturbation.
Concretely, there are two basic difficulties in applying
the above ICA-based attack to the rotation-based perturbation. First of all, if there is significant dependency between any attributes, ICA fails to converge and results in
less row vectors than the original ones, which cannot be
used to effectively detect the private information. Second,
even ICA can be done perfectly, the order of the original independent components cannot be preserved or determined through ICA [12]. Formally, any permutation
matrix P and its inverse P −1 can be substituted in the
model to give X 0 = AP −1 P X. ICA could possibly give
the estimate for some permutated source P X. Thus, we
cannot identify the particular column assuming that the
original column distributions are unknown or perturbed.
The effectiveness of the ICA reconstruction method
can be evaluated with the unified metric as well. The
VoDs are now calculated based on the reconstructed data
and the original data. Since the ordering of the reconstructed row vectors is not certain, we estimate the VoDs
with the best effort − considering all of the d! possible orderings and finding the most likely one. The most
likely ordering is defined as the one that gives the lowest privacy guarantee among all of the orderings. Let
X̂k be the ICA reconstructed data X̂ reordered with one
be the minimum privacy
of the row orderings, and pmin
k
= min1≤i≤d
guarantee for X̂k , k = 1 . . . d!, i.e., pmin
k
1
{ N wi (Cov(X̂k − X)(i,i) }. The ordering that gives lowest minimum privacy quality is selected as the most likely
ordering.

r(i)j r(i)k ckj −

j=1 k=1

2

d
X

r(i)j cij + cii )/wi }}

(6)

j=1

Since the matrix R0 generated by swapping the rows of R
is still a rotation matrix (recall section 3.1), the above local
optimization step will not change the rotation-invariance
property of the givenclassifiers.
The unified privacy metric evaluates the privacy guarantee and the resilience against nave inference − the first
type of privacy attack. Considering the approximationbased inference − the second level of privacy attack
through applying some reconstruction method to the random rotation perturbation, we identify that Independent
Component Analysis (ICA) [12] could be applied to estimate the structure of the normalized dataset X. We dedicate the next section to analyze the ICA-based attacks and
show that our rotation-based perturbation is robust to this
type of inference attacks.

4.4 ICA-based Attack to Rotation Perturbation
Intuitively, one might think that the Independent Component Analysis (ICA) could be considered as the most
commonly used method to breach the privacy protected
by the random rotation perturbation approach. However,
we argue that ICA is in general not effective in breaking
the rotation perturbation in practice.
ICA is a fundamental problem in signal processing which is highly effective in several applications
such as blind source separation [12] of mixed electroencephalographic(EEG) signals, audio signals and the
analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) data. Let matrix X composed by the source signals, where each row vector is a signal. Suppose we can
observe the mixed signals X 0 , which is generated by linear transformation X 0 = AX. ICA model can be applied
to estimate the independent components (the row vectors)
8

Algorithm 1 Finding a Better Rotation (Xd×N , w, m)

We observed that, when there is certain dependency between the attributes (columns), the ICA method cannot effectively lower the privacy guarantee. More importantly,
one can carefully select the rotation matrix such that the
chosen perturbation is more resilient to the ICA-based attacks.

Input: Xd×N :the original dataset, w: weights of attributes in privacy
evaluation, m: the number of iterations.
Output: Rt : the selected rotation matrix, Tr : the rotation center, p:
privacy quality
calculate the covariance matrix C of X;
p = 0, and randomly generate the rotation center Tr ;
for Each iteration do
randomly generate a rotation matrix R;
swapping the rows of R to get R0 , which maximizes
min1≤i≤d { w1 (Cov(R0 X − X)(i,i) };
i
p0 = the privacy quality of R0 , p1 = 0;
if p0 > p then
generate X̂ with ICA;
p1 = min{pmin
, k = 1 . . . d!}, pmin
= min1≤i≤d
k
k
{ w1 (Cov(X̂k − X)(i,i) } ;
i
end if
if p < min(p0 , p1 ) then
p = min(p0 , p1 ), Rt = R0 ;
end if
end for

4.5 Selecting Rotation Center
Note that rotation does not perturb the points equally.
The points near the rotation center will change less than
those distant to the center. With the origin as the center,
the small values close to 0 keep small after rotation, which
is weak in protecting privacy. This can be remedied by
randomly “floating” the rotation center so that the weakly
perturbed points are not predictable. Concretely, the dimensional value of the center is uniformly drawn from the
range [0, 1], so that the center is randomly selected in the
normalized data space. The rotation transformation for
non-origin centers is done by first translating the dataset to
the center and then rotating the dataset. Let T be the translation matrix. The VoDs are not changed by translation
due to the fact Cov(R(X − T ) − X) ≡ Cov(RX − X).
When the center-translated rotation is applied to the original data, the center is simply scaled up (denormalized) by
the parameters si and ti defined earlier. Since translation
preserves all of the basic geometric properties, the classifiers seeking the geometric decision boundary will be still
invariant to translation.

to rotations. The second set shows privacy quality of the
good rotation perturbation. Finally, we compare the privacy quality between the condensation approach and the
random rotation approach. All datasets used in the experiments can be found in UCI machine learning database 2 .

5.1

Rotation-invariant Classifiers

In this experiment, we verify the invariance property
of several classifiers discussed in section 3.2. Three classifiers: KNN classifier, SVM classifier with RBF kernel,
and perceptron, are picked as the representative of the discussed three kinds of classifiers.
Each dataset is randomly rotated 10 times with different rotation matrices. Each of the 10 resultant datasets
is used to train and cross-validate the classifiers. The reported numbers are the average of the 10 testing results.
We calculate the difference of performance, i.e., accuracy,
between the classifier trained with the original data and
those trained with the rotated data.
In the table 1, ‘orig’ is the classifier accuracy to the
original datasets, ‘R’ denotes the result of the classifiers trained with rotated data, and the numbers in ‘R’
columns are the performance difference between the classifiers trained with original and rotated data, for example,
“−1.0 ± 0.2” means that the classifiers trained with the
rotated data have the accuracy rate 1.0% lower than the
original classifier on average, and the standard deviation
is 0.2%. We use single-perceptron classifiers in the experiment. Therefore, the datasets having more than two
classes, such as “E.Coli”, “Iris” and “Wine” datasets, are
not evaluated for perceptron classifier. It shows that the
accuracy of the classifiers almost does not change when
rotation is applied.

4.6 Putting All Together: Randomized Algorithm for Finding a Better Rotation
We have discussed the unified privacy metric for evaluating the quality of a random rotation perturbation with
the unified privacy metric. We have also shown how to
choose the rotation matrix in order to maximize the unified metric in terms of the naive value estimation attack
(naive inference) and reconstruction-based estimation attack (approximation-based inference). In addition, we
choose to randomly optimize the rotation so that the attacker cannot inference anything from the optimization algorithm.
Algorithm 1 runs in a given number of iterations. Initially, the rotation center is randomly selected. In each
iteration, the algorithm randomly generates a rotation matrix. Local maximization of variance through swapping
rows is then applied to find a better rotation matrix, which
is then tested by the ICA reconstruction. The rotation matrix is accepted as the currently best perturbation if it provides higher minimum privacy guarantee than the previous perturbations.

5 Experimental Result
We design three sets of experiments. The first set is
used to show that the discussed classifiers are invariant

2 http://www.ics.uci.edu/∼mlearn/Machine-Learning.html
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Dataset
Breast-w
Credit-a
Credit-g
Diabetes
E.Coli
Heart
Hepatitis
Ionosphere
Iris
Tic-tac-toe
Votes
Wine

N
699
690
1000
768
336
270
155
351
150
958
435
178

d
10
14
24
8
7
13
19
34
4
9
16
13

k
2
2
2
2
8
2
2
2
3
2
2
3

KNN
orig
97.6
82.7
72.1
73.3
85.1
78.9
80.8
86.4
94.6
99.0
92.5
98.3

R
−0.5 ± 0.3
+0.2 ± 0.8
+1.2 ± 0.9
+0.4 ± 0.5
+0.2 ± 0.8
+2.1 ± 0.5
+1.8 ± 1.5
+0.5 ± 0.6
+1.2 ± 0.4
−0.3 ± 0.4
+0.4 ± 0.4
−0.6 ± 0.5

SVM(RBF)
orig
R
97.2 0 ± 0
85.5 0 ± 0
76.3 0 ± 0
77.3 0 ± 0
78.6 0 ± 0
84.8 0 ± 0
79.4 0 ± 0
89.7 0 ± 0
96.7 0 ± 0
98.3 0 ± 0
95.6 0 ± 0
98.9 0 ± 0

orig
89.1
64.6
70.1
66.6
67.4
79.4
66.9
56.6
60.3
-

Perceptron
R
−4.9 ± 1.2
+4.7 ± 1.5
−0.1 ± 0
−4.5 ± 0.8
−0.41 ± 1.0
−0.3 ± 0.8
−1.8 ± 0.6
+8.0 ± 0.6
−2.8 ± 1.3
-

LOPmin

LOPavg

ICAmin

ICAavg

0.41
0.31
0.40
0.23
0.24
0.42
0.37
0.31
0.43
0.61
0.65
0.26

0.50
0.47
0.51
0.28
0.34
0.54
0.48
0.41
0.50
0.68
0.82
0.34

0.73
0.51*
0.52*
0.81
0.75*
0.50*
0.53
0.82*
0.69*
0.52
0.50
0.78*

0.95
0.97*
0.99*
0.95
0.95*
0.97*
1.00
1.01*
0.79*
0.88
0.99
0.97*

Table 1. Experimental result on transformation-invariant classifiers

5.2 Privacy Quality of Random Rotation Perturbation

future work.

5.3
We investigate the privacy property of the transformation approach with the multi-column privacy metric introduced in section 4. Each column is considered equally important in privacy preserving, thus,
the weights are not included in evaluation. We use
FastICA package, which can be downloaded from
http://www.cis.hut.fi/projects/ica/fastica/, in evaluating
the effectiveness of ICA-based reconstruction.
Right side of Table 1 summarizes the evaluation of
privacy quality on the experimental datasets. The results are obtained
√ in 50 iterations with Algorithm 1. The
numbers are V oD = σ, i.e., standard deviation of the
difference between the normalized original data and the
perturbed/reconstructed data (LOPs/ICAs). The column
LOPmin represents the locally optimal minimum privacy
guarantee in the 50 iterations. LOPavg represents the locally optimal average privacy guarantee. ICAmin and
ICAavg represents the lowest minimum privacy and average privacy the ICA reconstruction can achieve in the
50 iterations, respectively. Among the 12 datasets, ICA
does not converge for 7 datasets which are marked by ‘*’
and thus not effectively reduce the privacy guarantee. For
the rest 5 datasets, ICA can possibly reduce the privacy
quality by some small amount, such as “Tic-tac-toe” and
“Votes”.
Figure 3 for dataset “Breast-Wisconsin” shows that
data estimated by ineffective ICA reconstruction. In this
case, the local optimized rotation perturbation is selected
as the best perturbation. Figure 4 shows that ICA reconstruction may undermine the privacy quality for some
datasets. In this case, the actual privacy guarantee will be
located at between the locally optimized privacy guarantee and the ICA reconstruction lowered privacy guarantee, for we can always select a rotation matrix that is more
resistent to ICA reconstruction. When it is detected that
ICA reconstruction can seriously reduce the privacy guarantee, say, to less than 0.2, we need additional methods
to perturb the data so that the conditions for effective ICA
reconstruction are not satisfied. We leave this as a part of

Rotation-based Approach vs. Condensation
Approach.

We design a simple algorithm to estimate the privacy
quality of condensation approach. As we mentioned, since
the perturbation part is done within the KNN neighbors, it
is highly possible that the perturbed data is in the KNN
neighbors of the original data too. For each record in the
perturbed dataset, we try to find the nearest neighbor in
the original data. By comparing the difference between
the perturbed data and its nearest neighbor in the original
data, we can approximately measure the privacy quality of
condensation approach.
Intuitively, the better locality the KNN perturbation is,
the better the condensation approach can preserve the information, but the worse the privacy quality is. Figure
5 and 6 show the relationship between the size of condensation group and the privacy quality on “E.Coli” and
“Diabetes” datasets. It was demonstrated in the paper [1]
that the accuracy of classifiers becomes stable with the increase of the size of condensation group. However, we
observed that the privacy quality generally stays low, no
matter how the condensation size changes. Experiment on
both datasets shows the minimum privacy guarantees are
very low, neither are the average privacy levels. We also
observed that the minimum privacy is 0 for “Ionosphere”
data, which happens to contain one column that has the
same value. Condensation method seems not working for
such cases at all. Supported by the other two Figures (7
and 8), we can conclude that the condensation approach
only provides weak privacy protection and we cannot possibly adjust the perturbation to meet the higher privacy requirement.
While the rotation approach provides almost zero-loss
of information for classification, it also presents much
higher privacy quality than the condensation approach.
Figure 7 and 8 shows the comparison on the minimum privacy guarantee and the average privacy guarantee of the
two approaches. The numbers for rotation approach are
the results generated by the randomized algorithm in 50
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Random Optimization for Votes Data

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3

0.6

0.4

No local OPT
Local OPT
Best ICA Attack
Combo OPT

0.3
0.2

0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01

0.1

0

0

21
31
# of iterations

41

1

22

26

30

Average Group Size

Figure 6. Privacy quality of
condensation approach on
Diabetes data.
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Figure 7. Comparison on
minimum privacy level.

iterations. For exmaple, in Figure 7, “Rotation-Min” denotes the optimal minimum privacy guarantee, taking the
ICA-attack into account as we discussed. We see that the
rotation approach can easily provide much higher privacy
level than the condensation approach.
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ICA-based data reconstruction attacks. Our experimental
result shows that the geometric rotation approach not
only preserves the accuracy of the rotation-invariant classifiers, but also provides much higher privacy guarantee,
compared to the existing multi-dimensional perturbation
techniques.
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